El tema del “TLC”, sigue AL ROJOVIVO, los precios de los servicios y productos básicos, van “ESCALERA AL CIELO”, los salarios en picada y con la clara amenaza de su CONGELAMIENTO y posterior rebaja, es decir el argentinazo, si lo permitimos, está a la vuelta de la esquina.
Esta situación, congelamiento salarial y escalada en los precios de los servicios y productos básicos, tiende a agravarse.
Los derechos laborales, conquistados en el Código de Trabajo, Convenciones Colectivas de Trabajo y Reglamentos de Trabajo, están siendo seriamente cuestionados por los NEOLIBERALES del libre comercio.
El objetivo es desaparecer toda norma o derecho que proteja la relación laboral y el derecho del trabajador a contar con una digna remuneración salarial. Los derechos laborales y garantías sociales son una real barrera a los intereses que persiguen quienes impulsan el “TLC”.
La Dirección Nacional de ANEP, llama a todas sus seccionales, delegados y delegadas y bases de todo el país, a prepararnos para realizar en las próximas semanas, un PAROTOTAL DE LABORES, para exigirle al Gobierno de la República convocar de inmediato a la Comisión Negociadora de Salarios del Sector Público, para ajustar los salarios al nivel del alto costo de la vida, ponerle freno a la escalada en los precios de los servicios y productos básicos y exigirle al Gobierno respeto a las Convenciones Colectivas de Trabajo, normas, reglamentos y Convenios de la OIT que tutelan los derechos laborales.
Sin duda estas exigencias y defensa de las conquistas sociales y derechos laborales, son un freno real a los mezquinos intereses de la clase política empresarial que pujan por la ratificación del “TLC”.
Consideremos, que de alguna manera por omisión o por pura desidia, se ha permitido ajustes salariales muy por debajo del alto costo de la vida; por eso los salarios que percibimos no alcanzan para cubrir medianamente nuestras necesidades fundamentales.
Ahora ya nos anuncian el congelamiento de los salarios, si lo permitimos estamos a la puerta de encontrarnos con la propuesta de discutir a qué sectores laborales se les empieza a rebajar el salario. ¡Posiblemente se empezará por los que ganan más!
Esperamos que la omisión, la indiferencia o la desidia no nos hagan llegar a tanto; si actuamos con firmeza y oportunidad, esta amenaza, punta de lanza del “TLC”, será derrotada y los derechos laborales y sociales preservados.
NO PERMITAMOS EL CONGELAMIENTOSALARIAL, PREPAREMOS EL PARONACIONAL
Tal y como quedó en evidencia y como fue acordado en dicha Cumbre Social, el día 1° de mayo, día de los trabajadores (as), fue una clara expresión de repudio al Tratado de Libre Comercio con EEUU. Los trabajadores (as) de nuestro país demostrando una gran madurez política y unitaria, desfilaron en consecuencia por la defensa de los intereses suyos y de la Patria manifestando un contundente rechazo al TLC.
En consecuencia con el Plan de Acciones, emanado de la Cumbre Social, se acordó convertir el próximo 16 de mayo, en el marco de la celebración del Día del Agricultor, en una Jornada Nacional contra el TLC y por la defensa de la soberanía y seguridad alimentaria de nuestro pueblo y esa es la convocatoria que está precisamente reforzando hoy la Comisión Nacional de Enlace en esta conferencia de prensa.
Aprovechamos esta oportunidad para manifestar, tal y como se hizo en la Cumbre Social, que los TLC y éste, entre Centroamérica y EEUU, lo que buscan es convertir en ley supranacional el modelo neoliberal, y ser con ello una especie de seguro contra cambios democráticos. Tal y como se expresó en una oportunidad, la negociación de acuerdos internacionales de inversión es como redactar la Constitución Política de un solo mundo, es decir, una especie de “Constitución”, en el sentido legal del término, que garantiza derechos al capital y prácticamente no marca obligaciones. Esto acuerdos delimitan lo que los estados pueden o no pueden hacer. En adelante las decisiones fundamentales de la política y estrategia económicas de nuestros países ya no corresponderán a las instituciones democráticas de cada país, se fijan en una ley supranacional.
En el caso de la agricultura, el caso de México, diez años después de firmado el Tratado de Libre Comercio de América del Norte (TLCAN) es ejemplarizante. De ser competitivo en los años 60, México ha perdido paulatinamente competitividad y en la actualidad no ha sido capaz de acortar la brecha frente a Estados Unidos.
Las importaciones de granos y olegaminosas se han incrementado dramáticamente . Caso similar sucede con las carnes, frutas de clima templado, etc. Esas importaciones han desplazado a los productores nacionales aumentando el desempleo en el campo y además han destruido parte de la infraestructura física del país. Los datos demuestran que México está perdiendo su soberanía alimentaria por una mayor dependencia de las importaciones que han generado una gran fuga de divisas. Año tras año crece la dependencia alimentaria. El desempleo crece en forma alarmante en el campo. La pérdida de empleos en el campo para el año 2002 llegaba a 1.78 millones y de ellos casi 600.000 se relacionaban con granos básicos, 40 % de los porcicultores abandonaron la actividad y de los productores de papa el 24% también lo había hecho. Igual sucedió con los arroceros, maiceros, etc. A esto lo llaman en México, una agrocidio.
A pesar del TLCAN, que se suponía atraería más inversión extranjera para el campo, generaría más empleo y aumentarían las remuneraciones de los trabajadores, la pobreza se ha incrementado; según cifras oficiales, el 69.3% de la población en el campo es pobre.
Las supuestas ventajas para los consumidores de tener acceso a alimentos más baratos a partir de las importaciones resultan ser pura demagogia. En México por un lado, de 1994 a 2002, los precios de la canasta básica se han elevad 257%, mientras que los precios al productor agropecuario subieron sólo 185%, según datos del propio gobierno mexicano. Por el otro, el salario promedio de los trabajadores y consumidores mexicanos bajó en 21% desde que se aprobó el TLCAN.
EL TLCAN ha ocasionado la transformación más dramática y profunda en la historia de la agricultura mexicana. El presente y futuro de esta ha sido trastocado, la opción de vida en el campo para la gran mayoría de los miles de productores está puesta en duda. Las organizaciones de productores pequeños, medianos y empresariales maiceros, soyeros, frijoleros, arroceros, paperos, algodoneros, manzaneros, porcicultores, ganaderos, ete, que representan la gran mayoría de los agricultores y ganaderos del país, claman por la suspensión del TLCAN o por lo menos su renegociación, porque los ganadores son cerca de mil personas, frente a millones de perdedores.
En Costa Rica no será diferente. Miles de agricultores se unirán a las filas de los perdedores y a las filas de la pobreza y el desempleo si se aprueba el TLC con Estados Unidos. Por eso enviamos nuestra solidaridad a los agricultores en su día, que también están sumados en la causa común contra ese TLC anexionista.
Nos sumamos también a las miles de familias costarricenses que día a día miran como su salario no alcanza y los llamamos a sumarse a la protesta nacional. Nos sumamos a los costarricenses que repudian día a día a esa clase política ciega y sorda que lo único que ambiciona es el poder para seguir favoreciendo los negocios de Riteve, Alterra, etc, y que ha sido absolutamente permisiva con la corrupción.
Llamamos pues a todo el pueblo de Costa Rica, lastimado en lo más profundo por esa clase política corrupta y corroída a protestar contra lo que ocurre en nuestro país, cuando un sector político económico neoliberal, que amparado al TLC, pretende imponer su modelo económico, es decir la contrarreforma social, entregando la salud, la educación, las telecomunicaciones, los seguros, la agricultura, la energía, la biodiversidad, la soberanía, etc., a las transnacionales.
La Comisión Nacional de Enlace refuerza el carácter pacífico de la actividad y reitera que la acción de protesta es solamente por el día 16 tal y como se acordó en la Cumbre Social y con base en esos acuerdos prepara las futuras acciones.
Comisión Nacional de Enlace (CNE) ¡Por la defensa de la Patria, NO al TLC!
En primer lugar, es totalmente cierto que se recibió una contribución de la organización norteamericana denominada “FREEDOMSOCIALISTPARTYNATIONAL OFFICE” (sic), por un valor de $50.00 (cincuenta dólares estadounidenses); mediante cheque no. 3997 de la sucursal del BANK OF AMERICA en Seattle, Washington; para efecto de lo que los mismos indican en misiva enviada a Albino Vargas como “asistencia en la lucha contra el CAFTA”. Me parece que el lector coincidirá con nosotros en el hecho de que la donación en cuestión no es a todas luces una “contribución millonaria”, como han querido resaltar nuestros detractores.
Por otro lado, cuando la ANEP decide hacer el llamado a través de la Internet al mundo entero, para que apoyen nuestra lucha en contra del Tratado de Libre Comercio con los Estados Unidos; es claro que cualquier persona o entidad en cualquier parte del globo terráqueo puede verse motivada a colaborar con nosotros y por tanto enviar un donativo en dinero, si su condición, su filosofía y su altruismo así se lo permiten; siempre y cuando las mismas provengan de fuentes honorables. Sin embargo, el objetivo de nuestro llamado no es, y nunca ha sido, el hacernos millonarios a base de donativos; sino más bien crear conciencia mundial sobre el peligro que dicho Tratado representa para nuestro país y sus naciones hermanas, en cuanto al asalto de su soberanía y de sus instituciones públicas; por parte de una potencia extranjera.
Finalmente, debo declarar con todo orgullo y tranquilidad, que la ANEP a la fecha, y hasta donde nuestros registros contables prueban fielmente, no está siendo financiada por ninguna agrupación nacional o internacional de derecha, izquierda o centro. Nuestros ingresos provienen básicamente de los aportes de nuestros asociados del sector público y privado, los cuales contribuyen de forma libre y generosa al mantenimiento de nuestra organización, y a los cuales nos debemos en la defensa de sus intereses como trabajadores, y como pueblo. Cierto es, que en algunas ocasiones hemos recibido ayudas de otras organizaciones sindicales hermanas tanto de este como de otros países, en la organización de seminarios, talleres, proyectos, marchas o invitaciones a participar en actividades dentro y fuera de nuestras fronteras, pero dichas contribuciones aunque loables desde el punto de vista de la solidaridad, distan mucho de ser el abultado financiamiento de que nos hablan nuestros enemigos.
Comprendo que es normal que una agrupación política, como es el caso del partido Libertario, tome las noticias aparecidas en este diario y las acomode a sus intereses; escudados en una supuesta preocupación por el pueblo que dicen representar, pero lo cierto es que a la fecha esta agrupación así como otras ya muy conocidas, no han podido dar respuesta clara a los cuestionamientos, que reiteradamente se les plantean, con respecto al financiamiento millonario de sus propias campañas políticas. Los invito señores, a que así como lo dice la Biblia, limpien bien la basura de sus propios ojos, antes de tratar siquiera de sacar la paja del ojo ajeno.
Lic. Eduardo E. Roldán Álvarez Contador. ANEP. CPI. 25962
Atención: Embajada de los Estados Unidos de América, en Costa Rica.
Señor Presidente Bush:
Tenemos plena conciencia de que nos dirigimos al presidente de la nación más poderosa, económica y militar del mundo.
Usted lo sabe Sr. Presidente Bush: Los y las costarricenses constituimos un país pequeño, territorial y económicamente hablando y, dichosamente, sin la carga de la existencia de un ejército; institución ésta que tanto dolor, calamidad y pobreza le han traído a nuestros pueblos latinoamericanos.
Nos dirigimos a usted, Sr. Presidente Bush, con la dignidad y la grandeza que nos dan más de cien años de vida democrática y con el orgullo de ostentar el más robusto conjunto de instituciones y empresas del Estado, que han sido valuarte, sostén y fortalecimiento de nuestro modelo de desarrollo, basado en principios cristianos de solidaridad y humanismo.
Un modelo de sociedad sustentado en el apoyo, impulso y respeto a la iniciativa privada, con una sana participación del Estado en aquellas áreas de la inversión de carácter estratégico, es decir de interés público; complementado con un conjunto de políticas públicas que inciden en la distribución y redistribución de la riqueza.
Sobra decirlo, Sr. Presidente Bush, pero este modelo de desarrollo ha permitido a la familia costarricense, exhibir los más altos índices de desarrollo humano de todo el continente latinoamericano; a pesar de la pequeñez de nuestra economía y al deterioro sufrido por la implementación de los programas de ajuste estructural y las políticas del llamado Consenso de Washington que tanta miseria han dejado en todo el continente latinoamericano.
Y lo más importante Sr. Presidente Bush, este modelo ha sido el garante de la paz social; elemento que ha permitido un ambiente seguro para el desarrollo de la producción nacional y la inversión extrajera.
Por ello, no entendemos Sr. Presidente Bush, porqué su Gobierno intenta imponernos la firma de un tratado de libre comercio, que destruye nuestro modelo de desarrollo, fundamento de nuestra cultura nacional y de la institucionalidad democrática que el mundo nos reconoce.
No entendemos en qué le perjudica a la poderosísima nación que usted preside, el hecho de que, en un país pequeño como el nuestro, queramos tener instituciones que nos brinden servicios de calidad y al alcance de la gran mayoría de nuestra población.
Por eso Sr. Presidente Bush, deseamos trasmitirle nuestro rotundo rechazo a este TLC, pues el mismo ofende nuestra idiosincrasia, quebranta nuestra institucionalidad, humilla nuestra dignidad e irrespeta el derecho que como pueblo tenemos para definir nuestro propio proyecto de desarrollo.
Sabemos que una gran y poderosa nación como la que usted representa, habrá de entender el orgullo, aprecio y sentimiento que expresamos los y las costarricenses por nuestro sistema institucional; columna vertebral de nuestro sistema de desarrollo económico, político y social.
Se trata de un modelo que nos ha permitido ser ejemplo de convivencia pacífica para todo el mundo. Esto, Sr. Presidente Bush, no estamos dispuestos a perderlo.
Esperamos que esa gran nación y su autoridad en particular, nos comprendan y nos demos la oportunidad, dentro de un marco de mutuo respeto, de forjar lazos comerciales que en vez de destruir vengan a fortalecer, aún más, la institucionalidad democrática, la amistad e ideales que históricamente han unido y compartido nuestros pueblos.
Este TLC, tal y como nos es impuesto, Sr. Presidente Bush, niega estos ideales y condena a nuestro pueblo a dejar de ser dueño de su propia historia; por tanto, rechazamos, tajantemente, la conclusión de este “tratado comercial”.
Dejamos en sus manos, a través de su Embajada en Costa Rica, la obra “101 razones para oponernos al TLC entre Centroamérica y Estados Unidos”, elaborada por el Dr. Henry Mora, prestigioso intelectual y académico de nuestro país, de la Facultad de Economía de la Universidad Nacional; razones que a nuestro buen entender, son suficientes para fundamentar nuestro rotundo rechazo a este “tratado de libre comercio”
Sin más nos suscribimos de usted con toda consideración,
MOVIMIENTO CÍVICONACIONAL PLATAFORMASINDICAL COMÚN CENTROAMERICANA (PSCC-COSTARICA) —- c.: Congreso de los Estados Unidos de América. c.: Gobiernos y parlamentos centroamericanos. c.: Gobierno y parlamento de Costa Rica. c.: Prensa nacional e internacional.
Como a usted le consta, hemos discrepado abiertamente en diversas ocasiones sobre decisiones adoptadas en ámbitos diversos, por el Gobierno que usted encabeza.
Particularmente, en cuanto al tema del denominado tratado de “libre” comercio (TLC), con los Estados Unidos de América, las discrepancias han sido evidentemente obvias. Los acontecimientos que ha vivido el país al respecto, en las últimas semanas y meses, así lo muestran.
Pese a todo ello, hoy tenemos que reconocer, como prudente y oportuna, la decisión que usted ha adoptado, para no enviar al trámite legislativo el TLC; considerando que la actual y venidera coyuntura política en la potencia del norte, pone en entredicho dicho tratado.
La decisión que usted ha tomado, Sr. Presidente, contribuye a mantener la necesaria paz social que Costa Rica siempre ha buscado; pues hoy en día una situación de estabilidad es más que urgente y necesaria, ante otros desafíos pendientes de atender, especialmente para la clase trabajadora y el pequeño y mediano empresariado, ante una situación económica acongojante.
No hay necesidad de llevar al país a una confrontación que, aparte de dolorosa, sería innecesaria en los actuales momentos; pretendiendo forzar la tramitación legislativa de un TLC cuyos cuestionamientos, críticas, reservas y rechazos han venido creciendo sistemáticamente, en ámbitos más allá de los sindicales.
Hoy, la amplia coalición de grupos, organizaciones y personas contra ese TLC, van desde las entidades laborales hasta sectores empresariales. Por demás, ecologistas, estudiantes, movimientos de mujeres, agrupaciones eclesiales, prestigiosos intelectuales y académicos, entre otros, vienen aportando elementos de sólida argumentación que contradicen lo que hasta ahora se le ha dicho al pueblo costarricense, sobre las “bondades” del TLC.
Para muestra un botón: El artículo de opinión denominado “Democracia tridimensional: Un TLC equitativo y respetuoso de nuestras instituciones”, aparecido en la página 30A de La Nación, del día de ayer, miércoles 7 de junio; en el cual un prestigioso grupo de ciudadanos y de ciudadanas, de distinta procedencia profesional y política, critica el TLC hoy ya tan cuestionado.
Como es lógico suponer, su prudente y oportuna decisión ya está recibiendo las primeras críticas y vendrán las fuertes presiones de los sectores entreguistas y antipatriotas que ven en el tal TLC tan sólo “oportunidades de negocios”, totalmente excluyentes y antisolidarias según nuestro criterio; negocios jugosos con el más rentable patrimonio público que nos fue heredado de las generaciones anteriores y que pertenece a la totalidad del pueblo costarricense.
Sin embargo, a pesar de tales presiones, esa oportuna decisión suya debe mantenerse. En la amplísima y variada gama de grupos opositores al TLC, ya en coalición articulada para actuar organizadamente, esa decisión ha sido bien vista.
Creemos que se ha pensado primero en la paz social antes que en los negocios de un pequeño grupo de personas, ya de por sí bastante adineradas.
Bien es mejor apelar, como usted lo ha hecho, a esa actitud costarricense de cautela, de “esperar a que se aclaren los nublados del día”.
Respetuosamente,
Albino Vargas Barrantes Secretario General ANEP
Fabio Chaves Castro Presidente ASDEICE
—- c.: Señores diputados y señoras diputadas, Asamblea Legislativa. c.: Señores Ministros y señoras Ministras de Estado. c.: Comisión Nacional de Enlace de los Sectores Sociales. c.: Señores Obispos, Conferencia Episcopal de Costa Rica. c.: Federación Nacional de Trabajadores de los Servicios Públicos (FENTSEP). c.: Cámaras empresariales. c.: Medios de Comunicación Colectiva. c.: Junta Directiva Nacional de ANEP. c.: Junta Directiva Nacional de ASDEICE.
Recibimos su atenta e importante carta, fechada el pasado 21 de junio.
Naturalmente que estamos de acuerdo en que nuestra carta sobre las objeciones que tenemos en contra del TLC con los Estados Unidos, se divulgue y se dé conocer de la mejor manera; por tanto, autorizamos que se incluya en su página de Internet.
En Costa Rica se ha estado estudiando mucho sobre el TLC en diversos ámbitos. En esta ocasión le recomendamos tres personas de gran prestigio y credibilidad que se han dedicado a analizar el TLC, para puntualizar la serie de errores y amenazas que contiene para un país como el nuestro y para el Estado Social de Derecho que Costa Rica ha tenido en las últimas décadas, lo cual nos ha destacado dentro del conjunto de las naciones latinoamericanas. Esas personas son:
Dr. Henry Mora Jiménez, economista. Dirección electrónica: hmoraj@una.ac.cr
Dr. José Luis Vega Carballo, sociólogo. Dirección electrónica: hmoraj@una.ac.cr
Estos tres costarricenses han estado alimentado con sus estudios sobre el TLC, las argumentaciones necesarias que nutren las posiciones de la amplia gama de sectores sociales y productivos que en Costa Rica estamos en contra del TLC.
A su vez, ellos le proporcionarán informes y contactos para satisfacer las inquietudes de su centro de estudios en el tema del TLC.
Le agradecemos muchos que nos haya considerado y esperamos que podamos seguir en contacto. Quedamos a su disposición para lo que se le ofrezca al respecto.
Muy atentamente,
Albino Vargas Barrantes Secretario General
—- c.: Dr. Henry Mora Jiménez. c.: Lic. Mauricio Castro Méndez. c.: Dr. José Luis Vega Carballo. c.: Junta Directiva Nacional de la ANEP. c.: Archivo.
On the 19th of December 2003, after nine rounds of negotiations, the United States reached agreement with four of the countries of Central America (Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua) on a proposal for a Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA). Costa Rica signed up to the agreement a month later, after two further rounds of negotiation.
The National Association of Public Employees of Costa Rica (ANEP), together
with a great number of social and political organizations from across Central
America and the United States, has initiated a campaign against the approbation
of this agreement. Para-phrasing David Ranney (Ranney, 2003, 50), ANEP believes
that CAFTA should be seen as just one more part of a global model of "free
trade" which glorifies the functioning of an unregulated market, that demonizes
government intervention and which treats human beings as consumers in a global
shopping mall. We would add, however, that this is a shopping mall which only
admits those who have the resources to consume, that is a minority of the world’s
population.
ANEP is opposed to this inaccurately named free trade agreement because it
will negatively affect both the impoverished majority of Central American people
and the working classes of the United States. The experiences of Mexico under NAFTA and other countries that have entered into these types of agreements suggest
that CAFTA is likely to result in an increase in poverty-levels across Central
America and a decline of working conditions and employment in the United States,
whilst any benefits are likely to become concentrated in still fewer hands.
In the pages which follow we outline the reasons for our opposition and the
potential consequences of the signing of CAFTA for both sides. Our objections
to CAFTA can be grouped into two broad categories. Firstly, those relating to
the procedures and rhythm of the negotiation process and secondly those related
to the contents of the agreement itself.
2. PROCEDURAL OBJECTIONS: CAFTAWASNEGOTIATED IN A RUSHAND ON THEBACKS OF OUR PEOPLE
2.1 THELACK OF DEMOCRATICACCOUNTABILITYANDPARTICIPATION
To the questions of who had access to information before and during the negotiation
process and who took the decisions, the answer is only a very small group of
individuals made up of the elites and powerful economic interests of our countries.
In addition, the negotiators for each country were technocrats appointed by
the executive of each participating government and these unaccountable negotiators
have signed each country up to far-reaching changes in their legal frameworks
which elected representatives will only have the chance to accept or reject
in their totality. Furthermore, once the agreement is signed, each government
will not have the authority to re-negotiate or modify it. In a region which
is attempting to construct open and democratic societies such secretism and
unaccountability in public processes is unacceptable.
If we are looking to construct and strengthen our institutions and create democratic
cultures with the active participation of our citizens, then the transparency
of procedures and the handling of information are arguably as important as the
outcome of what is negotiated. Seen in this way, CAFTA was anti-democratic from
the start, both in terms of the procedures through which it was negotiated and
in terms of public access to information. The lack of public participation in
the negotiation of CAFTA even goes against the new mechanisms of public participation
being implemented by international institutions such as the World Bank. All
Poverty Reduction Strategy programs, for example, have to be debated at length
by governments and representatives from across national civil society. Whilst
far from perfect, this process of participation has borne results. It is far
from clear why this type of public participation could not be applied to trade
negotiations which stand to have a much greater long-term impact upon economic
structures, employment opportunities and living conditions.
This lack of democratic accountability and participation are reason enough
for rejecting the CAFTA agreement as it stands. If there is to be a trade agreement
between our countries, then it must be negotiated on the basis of wide-ranging
domestic debates prior to the start of negotiations. Inclusive and permanent
mechanisms of consultation should also be established with representative participation
from the principal economic, political, institutional and social actors of each
country and, of course, each national parliament. At the very least, such consultation
should take place after each round of negotiation.
2.2 THEUNDUEHASTE OF THECAFTANEGOTIATIONS
A free trade treaty between the United States and Central America had not been
on the political agenda of the Clinton administration due to the limited size
of the Central American economy and the fact that the Caribbean Basin Initiative
(CBI) already existed. In January 2002, however, the Bush administration announced
their intention of aggressively pursuing such an agreement. One year later CAFTA
had been ‘successfully’ negotiated. As a point of comparison, the NAFTA negotiations
between the US, Mexico and Canada took four years. The change in US strategy
probably stemmed from the obstacles encountered in negotiating the Free Trade
Area of the Americas (FTAA) following the electoral triumph of more independently-minded
governments in various countries of the Southern Cone. President Bush hoped
that a rapid agreement with the Central American republics could, on the one
hand, be used as a trophy in his campaign for re-election and, on the other,
to strengthen his negotiating position in the wider framework of the FTAA (particularly
via the successful exclusion of the issue of agricultural subsidies from the
negotiations, Weiss, 2003).
The Central American Presidents, always compliant with Washington’s plans,
particularly those of Republican governments, allowed themselves to be brought
into Bush’s commercial strategy and his political rhythms, (ie his plans for
the FTAA and for his own re-election). It should be noted, for example, that
none of the Central American presidents had included the negotiation of a free
trade agreement with the United States as part of their electoral platform.
The speed with which Central American governments have been drawn into signing
agreements which will have profound implications on the longer-term development
aspirations of their peoples is, therefore, extremely worrying and it is crucial
that Central American civil society holds those governments accountable for
what they have negotiated. This is even more critical given that internal opposition
to the signing of CAFTA in the US is likely to be constrained by the fact that
Bush has managed to maintain ‘fast track’ negotiating authority for trade policy.
This means that Congress must accept or totally reject any trade agreement presented
before it – thus ruling out the possibility of modifying certain elements of
the treaty in response to public criticism.
3. THECONTENT OF CAFTA: SOLIDIFYINGTRANSNATIONAL DOMINANCE
3.1 GENERALISSUES
As always, the promoters of "free trade" say that it will solve all
of the great economic problems which confront our societies. Guided by the invisible
hand of the market and the free play of supply and demand they argue that CAFTA
will:
* Promote economic growth
* Create more jobs and better employment conditions through inward investment
* Reduce poverty
* Expand the range of goods available for consumers
* Improve the productivity and competitiveness of businesses
It should be noted that the evidence for any direct relationship between liberalization
and overall economic performance is complex and dependent on many political
and economic variables. In fact, in many cases, liberalization can have the
opposite effect, as new export opportunities are not grasped and external competition
in domestic markets increases. In this respect, the omens for Central America
are not good. Longer-term evidence suggests that, with the partial exception
of Costa Rica, previous rounds of trade liberalization since 1950 have seen
insufficient export expansion to compensate for the increasing penetration of
imports (Moreno-Brid and Perez, 2001). This is particularly worrying when one
considers that 90% of Central American exports to the US already enter tariff
free.
There is little evidence that liberalization will also address questions of
poverty and inequality. In fact, the evidence (albeit partial once again) suggests
that it may serve to intensify them. The basic issue is that we simply don’t
know what the impacts of such a profound program of liberalization will be in
a region such as Central America. The weak systems of government, the pre-existing
levels of poverty and inequality and the ecological vulnerability of the region
all point towards the potential for significant problems and the suspicious
naivety of any simple equation between liberalization and development/economic
modernization.
Our lack of knowledge of the potential impacts of CAFTA relates also to the
fact that this is by far the most unequal of all previous integration experiences.
Most forms of economic integration have taken place between nations with similar
types of economic structure – enabling real competitive advantages to accrue.
In the case of CAFTA, even more so than was the case of Mexico with NAFTA, we
are seeing the integration of two totally different economic structures which
will not necessarily respond in the ways predicted by orthodox economic theory.
The US market is much more important to the Central American nations than the
Central American markets are to the US, wage differentials for the same job
are as much as 15:1, and whilst barely 1% of the US EAP make their living from
agriculture, the figure is well over 20% for most of Central America and as
high as 35% in the case of Nicaragua. (McElhiney, 2004). One would have hoped
that if the richest nation on earth were to enter into a trade agreement with
some of the poorest nations in the Western hemisphere that it would do so on
the basis of a developmental agenda that deliberately prioritized improving
the position of the poorest, improving the labor, social and environmental conditions,
as well as the enforcement of the existing labor and environmental laws. Instead,
what we have is an agreement which is based upon reciprocity and the interests
of the powerful.
3.2 EVIDENCEFROMNAFTA
In many ways, CAFTA is a geographical extension of NAFTA. For that reason, it
is worth considering the evidence of the impacts that NAFTA has had on Mexico
and the United States (even though the asymmetries between Mexico and the US
were much less extreme than those currently existing between the US and the
Central American republics). Whilst it is important to recognize that NAFTA
is not the origin of all of the difficulties Mexico has faced since 1994, it
is clear that it has not improved many of the problems that it was supposed
to resolve (unemployment, poverty). In fact, if anything, it has aggravated
them. As such, the Central American republics would do well to consider the
proposed agreement in considerable detail before allowing their governments
to ratify it.
Looking at the evidence in more detail, it is clear that NAFTA has not had
a major impact on overall levels of economic growth in Mexico (average per capita GDP growth has been weak averaging only 1% per annum since 1994). Whilst export
growth has admittedly been strong, the trade surplus with the US must be put
in the context of Mexico’s growing trade deficit with Asia and Europe (which
has increased by 600% and 400% respectively since 1994; Nagal, Aguayo and Chavez,
2003). Furthermore, whilst about 8.1 million new Mexican jobs have been created
since 1994, this figure only represents 53.4% of the jobs that would have been
needed merely to provide employment for those newly entering the labor market
over this period. Furthermore, even in the manufacturing sector, employment
creation has not kept pace with the numbers of jobs lost in out-competed domestic
industries – to the extent that there are now 9,4% less people employed in the
sector than was the case prior to NAFTA. Perhaps even more significantly, the
quality of the employment that has been created has been extremely poor; a significant
proportion (about 55%) does not include minimum labor rights, such as social
security, paid holidays, pension schemes or Christmas bonuses. A last point
here is that Mexican wages have fallen in real terms by 36% since 1994, although
workers have increased their productivity by 53%. (Arroyo, 2003, 44-46)
In the US case, between 1994 and 2002 an estimated 525,094 workers were certified
as eligible for the NAFTAA-TAA (Transitional Adjustment Assistance) program
between 1994 and the end of 2002. From the start of 2003 to the present, another
215,706 workers have been certified under the revised TAA program – a sizeable
part of this number also relates to those affected by NAFTA (www.citizen.org/trade/forms/nafta).
The level of job loss is generating considerable labor instability and has had
other negative effects such as the use of reallocation as a threat against workers
who complain about worsening labor conditions and the weakening of trade unions.
In fact, the percentage of unionized workers in the US fell from 16% to 13%
over the course of the 1990s. Over the same period US labor productivity rose
25% whilst the level of real wages only rose by 8%. At the end of the 90s, employment
levels began to rise but most of the new jobs were created in enterprises that
paid low salaries. The outcome of these trends has been a lower quality of life
for US workers (Ranney, 2003, 51-56).
3.3 THEEMPLOYMENTIMPACTS OF CAFTA: THEINTENSIFICATION OF CURRENTDEVELOPMENT
PATTERNS
CAFTA will not, as is argued by its proponents, establish a new pattern of
development in Central America. Instead, it will deepen and accelerate the model
which has dominated the region since the 1980s – that of Neoliberal structural
adjustment. Under the influence of the international financial institutions,
the region has already seen wholesale reductions in public spending and the
coverage of basic social services, the widespread privatization of public enterprises
(and increasingly of public utilities) wide-ranging trade liberalization and
intensive labor market de-regulation. CAFTA stands to deepen many of these processes.
In relation to trade, for example, CAFTA will solidify, with some modifications,
the current Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI, 1983-2008). As such, it is useful
to reflect upon the major outcomes of these existing reforms, as a way of getting
an idea of the potential scenarios that would follow the final approval of CAFTA.
The first thing to note is that these types of policies have, at best, not
contributed towards tackling the endemic poverty of the Central American region
and, at worst, substantially worsened it. In 2001, for example, 50.8% of the
Central American people had insufficient income to cover the minimun requirements
for an adequate standard of living (see Figure One). 23% of these people were
living in conditions of extreme poverty which means that they were not able
to cover even their most basic needs. The incidence of poverty was 69% amongst
peasants and agriculture workers, 40.4% in the informal sector, and only 18.7%
amongst the formal sector workers (Proyecto Estado de la Nación, 2003,
47-48). It is worrying that it is precisely those rural sectors which are already
so riddled by poverty which are projected to be most adversely affected by CAFTA
(see the discussions on agriculture below).
Figure 1. Central America: Total and Relative Poverty, 2001.
Poverty
Central America (2001)
Total Poverty
Total
50.8
Urban Areas
33.6
Rural Areas
67.9
Extreme Poverty
Total
23.0
Urban Areas
10.8
Rural Areas
35.1
Source: Proyecto Estado de la Nación, 2003, 53.
The question is not simply one of poverty, however. There is considerable evidence
that trade liberalization, even where it brings economic benefits (and the case
for this is by no means established for CAFTA), tends to enhance levels of inequality.
This might be acceptable in situations where pre-existing levels of inequality
are reasonable but Central America is already considered to be one of the most
unequal regions of the world and this appears to have worsened under the Neoliberal
adjustment policies of the past ten to fifteen years. These worrying circumstances
are illustrated in Figure 2:
Figure 2. Central America: Indicators on inequality.
Central America population
Population (millions)
Income per capita (US$)
Total Income participation
40% poorest
10% richest population
Total
36.1
1,843
15.3
29.4
Costa Rica
4.0
3,948
13.8
32.1
El Salvador
6.3
2,104
12.8
40.3
Guatemala
11.4
1,680
11.8
36.5
Honduras
6.5
909,0
10.4
40.5
Nicaragua
5.1
472,0
12.9
37.1
Source: Proyecto Estado de la Nación, 2003, 69.
In this context, the argument of those promoting CAFTA is that any potential
‘teething’ problems relating to intensified poverty or inequality will be offset
by employment creation. The argument used by the Central American governments
is that the increased presence of maquilas (combined with the export-oriented
activities generated by the free trade agreement) will be a very important generator
of jobs and, over time, improvements in productivity and increases in real wages.
They point to improved official employment figures from the past few years to
justify this position and argue that CAFTA will intensify this form of employment
creation. However, even where official figures do show some reductions in unemployment
levels, these must be treated with some caution. Reductions in official measurements
of unemployment frequently mask increasing levels of under-employment, they
also ignore worsening labor conditions amongst those who are working and the
increasing impacts of out-migration from the region to de United States. A recent
study shows that, in the event of CAFTA approval there will be a negative impact
on the employment figures in Costa Rica (Castro, Martinez, 2004). There also
remain severe question marks over the accuracy of official statistics.
Another important point to highlight is on the quality of new jobs created
under the CBI and Structural Adjustment umbrellas. The Estado de la Región
(Proyecto Estado de la Nación, 2003) indicates that between 1990 and
1999, precarious employment and informal economy have been increased. It is
calculated that for every 100 new jobs that were generated in this period, 31
were in the formal sector, 12 in agriculture and the 57 in the informal sector.
The experiences of the last ten years of the development of free trade zones,
maquiladoras, and export-oriented agro-business in Central America indicate
that, for a variety of reasons, maquilas are unlikely to be the solution to
unemployment in the region and will not offset the job losses likely to occur
in other sectors.
In Costa Rica, the foreign investment has produced over the past 25 years only
35.000 jobs, which represent 2.5% of the EAP. (Nowalsky y Ruiz, 2001).
Just to take the case of textiles, whilst CAFTA will extend the provisions
of the CBI, allowing duty-free access to textiles produced in the region using
local materials and some access for textiles utilizing a proportion of external
inputs, the longer-term outlook for Central America’s textiles maquilas is not
rosy. CAFTA will allow the Central American governments to continue to offer
incentives in the existing export processing zones until 2009. At that point,
with the end of those incentives and the likely onslaught of duty-free access
from Chinese producers after 2005, the Central American textile sector is likely
to take a significant nose-dive – hardly the beacon of hope for the future claimed
by CAFTA’s proponents (McElhinney, 2004).
In terms of the quality of the jobs created in the maquila enclaves, there
are three points to emphasize:
1) The salaries paid are frequently less than those required for minimum subsistence
levels
2) Many companies employ over-exploitative working conditions:
a) Physical and psychological maltreatment.
b) The violation
of basic labor rights, including the prohibition of union organization and over-long
working days.
c) Unpaid salaries.
d) Sexual assault.
e) Arbitrary sackings, without redundancy payments and a high level of rotation
of the workforce.
3) Often companies do not provide even the most basic of worker’s benefits:
Social Security, and ten days of paid holiday per year.
These types of issues are highlighted by a number of studies by a range of
different organizations. The National Catholic Reporter (1999) summarize the
issues well:
"Ironically, while maquila employment had grown to 200,000 workers in
Central America (1996), this had made only a slight impact on massive unemployment.
Between 80 and 90 percent are new workers, women and children who were not previously
in the labor force. Applicants for employment are screened carefully. The younger,
and therefore less likely to complain, the better. Even 14-year-olds are accepted
if they say they are 16. Over 24, rejected. If "too fat," rejected.
Proof that the woman is not pregnant is demanded. Pregnancy is in most maquilas
a cause for firing. Some maquilas in Honduras, according to Charles Kernaghan,
director of the New York-based National Labor Committee, periodically give shots
of the contraceptive Depro Provera, saying it is for tetanus. There is no written
contract. Workers can be fired arbitrarily and without notice. Many maquilas
fire a worker before she becomes entitled to vacation time or the extra month’s
salary due in December. There is thus a constant movement from one employer
to another. A worker who attempts to form a union or is otherwise "a problem"
goes on a blacklist that is shared with others. Few survive the unhealthy working
conditions, poor ventilation, lint-heavy air and the harassment, verbal abuse,
strip searches and sexual harassment for more than six or seven years. Doctors
say most common illnesses are allergies, abortions, depression and tuberculosis.
They report pronounced bronchial hyperactivity and asthma from the cloth dust."
The appalling working conditions in these factories are accompanied by very
low levels of remuneration. Figure 3 below from the Maquila Solidarity Network,
for example, records average wages paid in maquilas across Central America in
1998, suggesting that wages in maquilas were as low as $64 a month in Nicaragua
in that year.
Figure 3:
Country
Maquila and garment workers
Wage (monthly)
Guatemala
180,000
$
El Salvador
69,000
$ 126
Honduras
238,923
$83
Nicaragua
28,097
$64
Costa Rica
75,816
—
Source: Maquila Solidarity, 2001.
Some of the apologists for CAFTA claim that provisions for the monitoring of
labor standards under the agreement will actually go a long way to addressing
these types of concerns over the working conditions in maquilas. They argue
that CAFTA will, for example, go further than the US-Chile free trade agreement
in addressing labor standards. US negotiators even claimed that the agreement
will be ground-breaking in its treatment of labor issues. However, historically
national labor frameworks in Central America have been high on rhetoric and
short on action and these are precisely the legal frameworks which will be relied
on under CAFTA. Despite government commitments to improving working conditions,
pernicious exploitation of labor under atrocious conditions has continued to
be rife in Central America and, if anything, has worsened as the maquila boom
has continued. It seems rather naive to rely on ‘good faith’ co-operation and
improvements in these existing national arrangements to improve working conditions
in the region. Even worse, when the proposals are read in detail, we find that
there are a number of elements which are actually a step backwards from even
the current situation. For example, the verification of meeting labor standards
will be carried out by governmental commissions, rather than independent bodies.
Furthermore, there appears to be no role for the active participation of trade
unions or grassroots organizations in the presentation of claims against companies
breaking regulations and any sanctions applied in proven cases will be directed
against governments rather than the companies concerned (Pensamiento Solidario,
2004). And further more the CAFTA proposals will not enforce the labor and environmental
rights that have been broken.
A more hopeful direction might have been to tie market access to demonstrable
improvements in labor conditions or, at the very least, to leave Central American
workers with some recourse to authorities outside of the control of their national
governments (McElhinny, 2004). This kind of proposals were elaborated in Costa
Rica by a coalition of employers, unions, agriculture organizations, professionals
and cooperatives (Tercera República, 2003).
3.4 CAFTAANDAGRICULTURE
Any trade agreement between the United States and Central America must recognize
that significant proportions of the poorest sectors across Central America still
make their living from agriculture. As such, any claims for the developmental
and anti-poverty credentials of CAFTA must demonstrate how rural poverty and
unemployment are going to be impacted by CAFTA.
The evidence from the Mexican experience under NAFTA suggests that Central
America’s rural communities are likely to face an extremely uncertain future
under CAFTA. Some of the larger-scale Mexican farmers and transnational agribusinesses
have exploited new agricultural opportunities since 1994 (particularly in terms
of the opening of new processing pants in horticulture). This success, however,
hides the fact that smaller subsistence farmers have been decimated by the onslaught
of cheap subsidized grain imports from the US. Overall, rural inequality has
sharply increased, rural poverty and out-migration intensified and environmental
degradation (through panicked over-production on unsuitable lands) accelerated
(Henriques and Patel, 2004). US corn exports to Mexico have doubled since 1994
but prices have dropped by more than half. This has its corollary in the environmental
destruction wrought in those zones of the US which have been turned over wholesale
to industrial scale grain production (see Miller and Shannon, 2002).
Furthermore, it is not poor family farmers that receive the lion’s share of
the US subsidies but rather some of the world’s largest corporations.
It is only the richer and more organized farmers that are able to take advantage
of the new opportunities that market liberalization embodies. This is precisely
the area that has been so lacking in many Central American countries. Governments
have abandoned the productive sector to the private sphere and private banks
have starved producers of credit – particularly the poorest farmers. In addition,
to respond to new opportunities and challenges requires not only capital but
also technical expertise – again something that has been less and less available
under the brutal government spending cuts of the past ten to fifteen years and,
as mentioned above, there is little talk of the US investing in these types
of measures in Central America over the implementation of CAFTA.
This of course assumes that there are new opportunities to respond to. In reality,
in return for opening up their economies to imports of US agricultural produce,
Central American countries have gained very little in the way of improved access
for their own agricultural produce to the US market since most agricultural
products already reach the US market tariff free under the CBI. The bigger barriers
are those relating to health and other quality-related restrictions which will
only be addressed through investment in the appropriate processing and packing
technologies (and enhancing the capacity of Central American producers to respond
to export opportunities). Although the security of the access that they currently
enjoy would at least be guaranteed. The problem is, however, as was the case
in Mexico, the bringing down of import protection leaves the way open for subsidized
US grain producers to drive down prices in Central American markets. This obviously
has positive impacts for the urban poor but it is not in the long-term interests
of the region’s agricultural producers. The likelihood is that it will lead
to increasing numbers of farm failures and increasing rural unemployment which
will not be offset by the creation of jobs in the industrial sector (WOLA, 2003).
These, of course, will have an immediate impact on the United States jobs and
labor standards, as well as a increase on the migration rate from Central America
de the United States.
These very serious worries mean that if the US does not address their subsidization
of agriculture (set at a level of $180 billion over the next ten years) then
the basis of CAFTA must be rejected and the Central American governments must
pursue a policy of subsidization of their own. At the very least they must be
free to impose tariffs on imports of subsidized US grains and other subsidized
goods. It seems bizarre for Central American governments to liberalize their
agricultural markets under CAFTA in circumstances where the US government has
placed the subsidization of their producers outside of the negotiation framework.
Even more so, when Central American governments had participated in the so-called
Group of 21 developing countries headed by Brazil and India at the Cancun meeting
of the WTO. It would seem most sensible to remove agricultural produce from
the negotiations until agreement has been reached at the WTO.(a point made by
the Nicaraguan economist Nestor Avendaño, el nuevo diario 31.05.2003)
The Central American governments and a variety of regional producer federations
did make some attempts to treat agricultural issues separately. There were,
for example, attempts to have agricultural issues dealt with in a separate chapter
of the agreement according to different rules (an idea rejected by the US).
It was also suggested that products which were particularly sensitive (e.g.
basic grains, dairy and pork) be exempted from the liberalization provisions
(again rejected by the US). Finally, some Central American governments pressed
for some form of compensation from the US government for the continued presence
of US subsidies in the agricultural markets to be liberalized under CAFTA, which
was rejected by the US negotiators. However, the problem with such a strategy
is that it is palliative and temporary, rather than a long-term solution to
rural problems. In addition, experience teaches us that this compensation would
be unlikely to reach the farmers who had been driven out of business by the
presence of cheap imported grain from the US. In the end all that was really
achieved by the Central American negotiators was a fifteen to twenty year period
of ‘grace’ for the liberalization of certain sensitive agricultural commodities
and a safeguard mechanism which would only kick in after it was clear that a
particular product sector has suffered severe problems. In essence the Central
American governments capitulated, moving from a unified regional strategy to
best protect the region’s agricultural producers to a bilateral strategy where
each was bullied into submission independently (McElhinney, 2004)
3.5 EFFECTS ON THEENVIRONMENT
For all of the money ploughed into pan-Central American environmental initiatives
over recent years (the projects of the Mesoamerican Biological Corridor, regional
disaster awareness projects, the CCAD etc.) it appears that environmental considerations
have not been central to the issues debated by the CAFTA negotiating teams.
There is clearly a need for effective sustainability assessments of the implications
of CAFTA but the speed of negotiation has precluded this. The experiences of NAFTA where side agreements were negotiated suggest some of the environmental
problems that may occur. An even less regulated and under-resourced attitude
towards natural resource management in Central America does not bode well for
the future of Central America’s fragile environments. – Expansion of production
of agricultural exports. – Pesticides. – Pollution in maquila zones etc. – Illegal
trade in endangered species threatening biodiversity (such trade increased between
Canada and the us following the 1988 free trade agreement).
In addition, under CAFTA national environmental safeguards may become untenable.
For example, several US TNC´s have used Chapter 11 of NAFTA to sue Canada
for public health bans on their products.
3.6 EFFECTS ON MIGRATION
As a consequence of the increasing inequality, as well as high levels of poverty
and lack of decent employments, documented and non-document out-migration towards
the United Stated has been increased. At the end of the 90s, 2.7 million of
Central American immigrants were living in the United States, of which almost
1 million were undocumented. (Orozco, 2003, 5) The greater exodus is from El
Salvador (25% of its population), followed of Nicaragua (15%) and Guatemala
(8%). (OCAM, 2000; Pretty, 2004).
For that reason, the exclusion of migration from CAFTA is other major limitation
of regional trade liberalization of this type is the lack of accompanying labor
market liberalization in terms of the free mobility of labor. A fully integrated
market of the type adopted in the EU presupposes the free mobility of labor.
A factor notably absent from the CAFTA proposals. As such, there is an inbuilt
maintenance of the differential remuneration of labor which makes a mockery
of the supposed free hand of the market.
3.7 EFFECTS ON PUBLICSERVICE DELIVERY/REGULATION
The prioritizing of CAFTA trade laws over other national levels of regulation
is also extremely worrying. A set of provisions called "disciplines on
domestic regulation" look set to limit the ability of governments to regulate
their own service sectors. This has much in common with the international attempts
being made to pursue the liberalization of services under GATS with one important
difference – under GATS individual governments are, at least in principle able
to nominate which sectors they wish to liberalize in a continual process of
negotiation, under CAFTA the whole ‘bundle’ has been negotiated at once (Weiss.
2003). In addition, the liberalization of services will also demand the wholesale
privatization of many sectors of those Central American public services that
still exist in state hands (e.g. water, energy, telecommunications, health,
higher education and postal services). In Costa Rica, the existing public services
systems, have been extremely important in order to reduce the effects of the
lowering wages and the increase of poverty. CAFTA impact on these systems will
function as an agravating condition on the Costa Rican living standards.
Under CAFTA the ability of Central American states to properly regulate their
own affairs looks to be under significant threat. Important issues include the
ability to control the spread of GMO foodstuffs and the ability to maintain
public delivery of basic services.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
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Trade Liberalization," Americas Program (Silver City, NM: Interhemispheric
Resource Center, January28, 2004.
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23/02/04.
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Americas Program (Silver City,NM: Interhemispheric Resource Center, July 15th,
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Program (Silver City, NM: Interhemispheric Resource Center, January 29, 2004).
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Myths About NAFTAand three lessons for Latin America," Americas Program
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CR: DEI, 2003, 49-66.
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Social, Laboral y Ambientalmente Limpia. 2003
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impacts on small farmers in Nicaragua’ submission to the Congressional Oversight
Group on Trade, 2003. http://www.wola.org/
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City, NM: Interhemispheric Resource Center, January 28, 2004.
I am writing, on behalf of one of the largest trade unions in Costa Rica, named Asociación Nacional de Empleados Públicos y Privados (ANEP) to express to you, and hopefully through you to order Congress Members, our adamant opposition to the Central America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) on which you may soon be asked to cast a vote. The Democrats have long been the champions of the labor, environmental, small farmer, immigrant and women’s perspective. CAFTA is opposed by the majority of groups representing these constituencies. I strongly urge you to oppose CAFTA.
CAFTA has no meaningful and enforceable standards for workers rights and environmental protection. CAFTA only allows for actions to be taken against the repeated failure of signatory nations to enforce their existing labor and environmental laws- regardless of the fact that the laws in Central America fall substantially below internationally recognized standards. There are significant loopholes within the proposed provisions that would make it extremely difficult to take action against a country that has repeatedly failed to enforce its laws, much less international standards. Central American countries routinely suppress union organizing efforts to keep wages artificially low, and reject establishing and enforcing environmental standards in order to attract foreign investment. The absence of such standards ensures that CAFTA would exacerbate the flight of United States jobs in manufacturing, professional services and agriculture, to create bad jobs in Central America.
CAFTA could devastate small farmers in both the U.S. and Central America. The elimination of an effective price floor would force down market prices, allowing corporate agribusiness to sell their products at far below cost. Under NAFTA, huge multinational agribusiness all but wiped out Mexican corn farmers, forcing many of them to abandon their families and communities to seek jobs in maquilas or to emigrate to the U.S. CAFTA opens the door to imports that threaten sensitive agricultural sectors like sugar beets, dairy, avocado, melon and others. The foreseeable outcome of CAFTA’s agricultural impacts will be the devastation of rural communities, reduction in food sovereignty for Central America, and increased migration to the U.S. Frederickson of the National
Farmers Union says “The CAFTA resembles failed trade policies of the past…further encourages a race to the bottom for producer prices and fails to address major issues that distort fair trade.” Further more, the increasing poverty levels that CAFTA will produce, will create the best ground for narcotrafic from South America to the United States.
CAFTA could force government to bid out certain essential government services forcing privatization and deregulation. Privatization would extend similar provisions as those that allowed Enron to take advantage of California to other essential services including water distribution, oil and gas development, education, telecommunications, energy, insurance services, and health care. CAFTA, covering federal, state and local services, would prohibit numerical limits on harmful service activities, potentially including zoning restrictions based on size or density, or other restrictions in sectors including waste disposal, tourism in sensitive areas and energy (oil and gas) extraction. This greatly restricts public and government participation in providing and regulating essential human services. This government participation has proven essential in the Costa Rican development.
CAFTA expands the definition of “investment” beyond NAFTA’s notorious Chapter 11, allowing corporations to sue governments over environmental, public health, and public safety protections in closed international trade tribunals. CAFTA’s architects failed to heed concerns expressed by the National Association of Attorney’s General, National Conference of State Legislatures, Congress and civil society that foreign corporations be granted no greater rights than those afforded U.S. citizens and businesses under domestic law.
I hope that you will champion a new international trade agenda that balances the needs of business, workers, communities and the environment. It is possible. Corporate negotiated trade like CAFTA is not responsible economic policy and will not contribute to long term growth. Please take a public position against CAFTA now.
Attached to this letter, you will find a paper that we have written about CAFTA. I look forward to your response to my comments.
El TLC: La CCSS será estrangulará financieramente, porque su gasto anual en medicinas, básicamente las de carácter genérico, subirá de 70 millones de dólares a 300 millones de dólares, si quiere seguir cubriendo a toda la población habitante del país. Ese gigantesco aumento de 230 millones de dólares será imposible de afrontar, reduciéndose, drásticamente, la cobertura, la calidad del servicio y el empleo.
RETROCESOLABORAL Y PERDIDA DE DERECHOS CONQUISTADOS: En Sala IV, los neoliberales tienen cuestionado el aporte del 3 % al F.R.E.; el 2.75 % de aporte patronal a la cuota de Enfermedad y Maternidad (tendríamos que aportar 5.5 %); el bono de garantía pagadero en junio; incentivos y pluses salariales (peligrosidad, riesgos, alimentación, rotación, disponibilidades médicas, etc.); 12 años de cesantía (se pretende reducción a 8); permisos y licencias; pago bisemanal; licencias y permisos sindicales.
CORRUPCIÓN Y TRAFICO DE INFLUENCIAS: Las escandalosas revelaciones de los últimos días, sobre la perniciosa relación de negocios privados con las compras de la Caja (situación que no es nada nueva como bien sabemos); muestran a las claras cómo ha ido cogiendo fuerza el negocio privado de los Servicios de Salud a partir de los recursos públicos de la institución. ¡A la Caja la están saqueando con complicidades internas a los más altos niveles!
NOSTOCA A NOSOTROS, LA GENTEHONESTA, DEFENDERLA Y SANEARLAPARAHEREDARLA A NUESTROSDESCENDIENTES.
“Curiosamente”, los que nos quieren quitar los derechos laborales conquistados y “curiosamente” los que se han beneficiado, directa e indirectamente, por acción y/o por omisión, con la corrupción y el tráfico de influencias; todos ellos son abanderados del TLC; de ese TLC que destruirá a la Caja si los dejamos.
ESTELUNES 31 DE MAYO, ÚNASE A LA PRIMERAACCION CÍVICA DE RESISTENCIACONTRA EL TLC Y POR LA DEFENSA DE LA CAJA. SUMÉMONOSAHORAQUE TODAVÍA ESTAMOS A TIEMPO. DESDELAS 9 A.M. EN EL PARQUE LA MERCED, HACIA LA ASAMBLEALEGISLATIVA.
– Alzas inmisericordes en los productos y en los servicios básicos que deterioran, aceleradamente, mi situación económica.
– Reajustes salariales que ofenden mi dignidad y que en nada compensan tales alzas, aumentando el deterioro el poder adquisitivo de mi salario.
– Corrupción campante y descarado tráfico de influencias que enriquecen a unos pocos, desprestigian nuestras más necesarias y valiosas instituciones, deteriorando los servicios públicos que necesito.
– Recortan el presupuesto institucional, se deteriora el servicio y yo soy el que me llevo la regañada de la gente por la mala atención.
– Paquetazo tributario en perspectiva: Pagaremos más y mayores impuestos para financiarle a los ricos de este país TLC.
– Quieren abolir el Código de Trabajo, derogar todos los derechos conquistados a su amparo y al de la Negociación Colectiva; además de restaurar la explotadora jornada de 12 horas.
– Y como si fuera poco, para acabarla de una vez, culminando todo este proceso, nos quieren imponer un TLC que, de un solo porrazo, acabará, totalmente, con el todavía vigente Estado Social de Derecho que nos hizo distintos del resto de Centroamérica: Acabarán con el ICE, con el INS, con la CCSS, con A y A, con el Derecho Laboral, con el ambiente, con el agro, con los puertos y con los aeropuertos… con todo.
¡Los neoliberales son insaciables, vienen por todo!
YO, COMOCOSTARRICENSE, ME RESISTO A QUE ME “CENTROAMERICANICEN”, SALARIAL Y SOCIALMENTECON EL TLC DE ELLOS. YO QUIEROSEGUIRSIENDOCOSTARRICENSE. AMO A MI PAIS.
ESTELUNES 31 DE MAYO, YO ME MANIFESTARÉ: IRE AL PARQUE LA MERCED, A LAS 9 DE LA MAÑANA, PARADESFILARHASTA LA ASAMBLEALEGISLATIVA. LUEGO REGRESARÉ A MI TRABAJO. LA PATRIA ME LLAMA Y YO NO LA DEFRAUDARÉ.
Nuestra lucha sociopolítica y sindical de la actualidad por la real Justicia Social parte de las formulaciones de propuesta alternativa al perverso neoliberalismo que hemos planteado en los últimos años; las cuales se entrecruzan con los valores y con los contenidos de la Doctrina Universal de los Derechos Humanos (DD.HH.); específicamente, con la serie de tratados en la materia que Costa Rica ha firmado y ha ratificado parlamentariamente hablando, jurando someterse a sus dictados.
Costa Rica no tiene “escapatoria”: cumple porque cumple, tal y como sucedió con el matrimonio igualitario y con la fertilización in vitro que ahora están en nuestro ordenamiento jurídico por mandatos de la Corte IDH.
Es una verdadera “ganga” para el eventual comprador del BCR que se lo llevaría en “combo” por tan ridículo precio, dado que el BCR es, en realidad, un conglomerado de negocios: BCR Pensiones, BCR Valores, BCR Sociedad Administradora de Fondos de Inversión, BCR Corredora de Seguros. Además, el BCR es el accionista mayoritario del Banco Internacional de Costa Rica (BICSA). ¿Qué significa todo esto? Para los más amplios sectores populares y los grandes grupos con conciencia cívico-patriótica, esto es un “megachorizo sin precedentes”.
Es momento de visibilizarse como mujeres, de demostrar las capacidades que nos caracterizan, de tomar los espacios en las aulas, de capacitarnos, de tomar decisiones, de que valoren nuestras capacidades en los puestos laborales, de apoyar a otras mujeres y niñas, para así minimizar los índices de desigualdad de la mitad de la población como lo son las mujeres.
El sistema Nacional de las juventudes en nuestro país, a través del tiempo ha estado bajo el control de no solo personas adultas tratando de imponer sus decisiones hacia las juventudes de nuestro país, sino que, a su vez, el Sistema Nacional de Juventudes ha estado secuestrado por intereses partidarios y esto ha incidido en que muy pocas personas jóvenes de nuestro país (de los 12 años a los 35 años), sepan que existe un Sistema Nacional de Juventudes.
